New York Medicaid: Never Can Say Goodbye by Fastiggi, Joseph
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 16
Issue 3 Summer 2007 Article 6
New York Medicaid: Never Can Say Goodbye
Joseph Fastiggi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fastiggi, Joseph (2007) "New York Medicaid: Never Can Say Goodbye," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 16: Iss. 3, Article
6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol16/iss3/6
NEW YORK MEDICAID: NEVER CAN SAY GOODBYE
Joseph Fastiggi*
I. MEDICAID OVERVIEW .............................. 584
A. A FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT COOPERATIVE
VENTURE TO TREAT THE "NEEDY" .. .................. 584
B. SHIFTING COSTS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
PRIVATE INSURANCE PLANS .......................... 586
II. NEW YORK MEDICAID .............................. 587
A. THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO OVERUSE EXPENSIVE
COURSES OF TREATMENT ............................ 587
B. NEW YORK'S MISALLOCATION OF ITS GREEN TO PUT
ITS POOR IN THE PINK ............................... 591
C. THE PRESCRIPTION FOR IMPROVING THE HEALTH OF
THE POOR ............................................ 593
III. REDEFINING NEW YORK MEDICAID'S PURPOSE .. 594
A. A CALL FOR GOVERNMENT REFORM ................. 594
B. ACCEPTING THE LIMITS OF HUMAN HEALTH AND
AFFIRMING THE VALUE OF INFORMED PERSONAL
CHOICE OVER HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ............. 597
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEDICAID ....... 599
A. THE FLORIDA PILOT PROGRAM AND THE FOLLY OF
MANAGED CARE PRIVATIZATION ..................... 599
B. THE VERMONT ELDER CARE PLAN ................... 601
C. THE SALUTARY INJECTION OF CHOICE INTO HEALTH
C ARE .............................................. 602
V. RECENT NEW YORK REFORM EFFORTS ............ 604
A. DRUG PRESCRIPTION SPENDING CONTROL ............ 604
B. HEALTH CARE PROVIDER FRAUD PREVENTION ........ 605
C. EASING NEW YORK MEDICAID'S UNIQUE BURDEN ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ............................... 606
D. SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS LINGER ........................ 608
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE .......................... 608
A. INFORMING THE MEDICAID POPULATION .............. 609
B. SIMPLIFYING THE ENROLLMENT PROCESS AND
DEMANDING BENEFICIARY RESPONSIBILITY ........... 610
C. IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE FOR
M EDICAID PATIENTS ................................. 613
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007. I would like to thank my parents for their inspiration
and support.
582 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:581
D. ENCOURAGING PREVENTIVE CARE AND DISCOURAGING
BEHAVIOR DETRIMENTAL TO HEALTH ................ 614
E. CONCLUSION ....................................... 615
As controversy swirls over continually rising health costs sapping
valuable resources from our economy,' relatively little consideration is
given to reducing the disproportionately high costs dedicated to often
marginally beneficial life prolongation. It is incumbent to assess how we
allocate our medical resources. Reform measures for Medicaid, a
government health insurance program for the poor, typically focus upon
reducing the numbers of people covered by the program, 2 the scope of
entitlements to receive certain drugs or procedures, 3 the short-term cost
savings of negotiating drug prescription reductions, 4 or fraud.5 However,
the tendency for the government to devote hi-tech, high cost procedures
to preserve the lives of the terminally ill for a marginally longer time
while ignoring more efficient methods of improving aggregate lifetime
health of the poor and needy are serious cost drains on an endemically
flawed health insurance system.
6
I National health care spending is approximately $1.9 trillion, 16% of the national
economy, a record high. In 2004, Medicaid spending was $290.9 billion, increasing at an
annual rate of 7.9%, the same rate as for total health care spending. Robert Pear, Growth of
National Health Spending Slows Along With Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A15.
2 See Richard L. Kaplan, Crowding Out: Estate Tax Reform and the Elder Law Policy
Agenda, 10 ELDER L.J. 15, 31-32 (2002) (noting, in the context of obtaining long-term nursing
care, that drawbacks to qualifying for Medicaid include impoverishing oneself, and that, due to
the cost-cutting trends of Medicaid to pay below-market rates for health care, many health
service providers no longer accept Medicaid recipients, or severely limit the number of
Medicaid recipients that they do accept, sharply proscribing health care options for Medicaid
patients).
3 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (2005) (hospital reimbursement provisions limiting
the amount which hospital service corporations, including health maintenance organizations,
may pay hospitals on behalf of its subscribers).
4 See, e.g., David Glendinning, Medicaid Panel Eyes Restrictions on Drugs Physicians
Prescribe, Am. MED. NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005, at 1-2 (discussing a set of recommendations that a
panel convened by the Department of Health and Human Services made on how to cut about
$11 billion from the federal Medicaid budget, including allowing states to negotiate drug
medication discounts, allowing managed care programs to access rebates, charging
beneficiaries for "non-preferred" drugs, restricting applicant entry into Medicaid through asset
transfers, and prohibiting states from taxing Medicaid managed care organizations to gain
federal matching funds).
5 Clifford J. Levy & Michael Luo, New York Medicaid Fraud May Reach into Billions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at Al; see also Mark Johnson, Pirro, Cuomo Differ on Medicaid,
N.Y. SUN, Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nysun.cormarticle/41187.
6 See Joanne Lynn et al., Financing of Care for Fatal Chronic Disease: Opportunities
for Medicare Reform, 175 W. J. MED. 299 (2001) (arguing that it is often cheaper for Medicare
social security insurance to allow families to provide their dying relatives with home care, but
that the system creates financial incentives for insurance providers to encourage the use of
expensive hospital services, including intensive care unit stays, instead).
NEW YORK MEDICAID
A government-run health insurance program should clearly differ
from a private insurance scheme. The government is obligated to cover
the necessary medical expenses of all qualifying beneficiaries, healthy
and sick alike, often for the remainder of their lives. 7 Therefore, public
Medicaid should have far greater incentive than private insurance
companies to invest in the future health of its beneficiaries by spending
more on preventive care. The government should offer health care
providers higher reimbursement rates for care like basic doctor visits and
long-term, non-acute treatment regimes, including smoking cessation
programs, nutrition clinics, and specialized rehabilitation treatment for
chronically ill persons. By preventing or delaying the onset of serious
medical complications, the government can help make the poor healthier
and more productive while reducing the long-term costs of their medical
treatment. Back on their feet, many of the temporarily impoverished
children and young adults on Medicaid will be more physically capable
of contributing to society rather than continuing to burden taxpayers at
the federal, state, and local levels.
This Note will argue that New York's Medicaid program should
reduce spending on terminal patient life sustenance and other acute
illness care and should increase spending on preventive care. Part I
discusses the basic structure of the Medicaid welfare health insurance
program. Part II describes, in closer detail, New York Medicaid, the
most expensive state Medicaid program in the country, and suggests that
New York Medicaid is failing to properly promote the health of its poor.
Part III introduces a concept for measuring the Medicaid program's
effectiveness according to the personal health outcomes of the program's
participants. Part IV analyzes recent trends in the Medicaid regime
across the nation, according to Part III's mode of analysis, and concludes
that New York must avoid continuing to delegate responsibility over
Medicaid to private managed care providers who confuse and discourage
the Medicaid-eligible population regarding Medicaid system utilization.
Part V discusses recent reform efforts in New York, which at best
amount to marginal improvements. Part VI proposes further reform
measures meant to provide incentives for Medicaid participants to lead
healthier lifestyles and to utilize more beneficial health care resources at
lower costs.
7 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (a physician must provide a qualifying
Medicaid patient with all medically necessary care); see also Einer Elhauge, The Limited
Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REv. 1525, 1539 (1996)
(arguing the "medically necessary" standard of care encourages overuse of expensive
treatment).
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I. MEDICAID OVERVIEW
A. A FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT COOPERATIVE VENTURE TO
TREAT THE "NEEDY"
Medicaid is a means-tested, fee-for-service insurance reimburse-
ment plan designed to provide medical assistance to persons unable to
meet the costs of medically necessary care and services. 8 Medicaid is
fundamentally a welfare program, generally requiring its beneficiaries to
be otherwise impoverished and therefore unable to pay for necessary
medical care.9 The federal government shares Medicaid costs with states
that elect to participate in the plan (which all do), and, in return, partici-
pating states must comply with the requirements that Medicaid statutes
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) impose.10 A
state Medicaid plan must cover the "categorically needy," persons eligi-
ble under strict financial means tests under the now-repealed Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) 1 or certain impoverished
individuals who qualify through Supplemental Security Income (SSI).12
A state may, at its option, cover the "medically needy," those applicants
who meet non-financial requirements but whose income or resources ex-
ceed the financial requirements of the program. 13 New York covers the
"medically needy," bringing in nearly two million people under this
heading, far more than any other state, and making medical necessity the
most common grounds by which people qualify for New York
Medicaid. 14
8 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2005); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156 (1986).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a (2005); Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care
Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 724-27 (1991) (arguing that impover-
ishment is a prerequisite for Medicaid coverage, including for middle-class nursing home re-
sidents who may "spend down" their assets and income to qualify for Medicaid long-term care
benefits, typically to cover nursing home costs).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 477 U.S. at 156-57.
11 Persons who would have been eligible for AFDC under AFDC requirements in effect
on July 16, 1996 are eligible for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-615 (2005).
12 Social Security Act, Title XVI §§ 1601, 1602, 1611, 1619(b), 1634, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1383c (2005) (§ 1619(b) grants continued Medicaid benefits for SSI recipients who
go back to work).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (delegating broad
authority to the HHS to set standards for determining the financial eligibility of Medicaid
applicants).
14 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005: A MEDI-
CAL INFORMATION SOURCE 2 (2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.govlMedicaidGenlnfo/
Downloads/MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005]. For
nationwide enrollment levels, see How MEDICAID WORKS: PROGRAM BASICS 13 (Congres-
sional Research Service) (last updated Mar. 16, 2005) (Figure 1. Medicaid Enrollees by Basis
of Eligibility, FY2002 & Medicaid Enrollees by Maintenance Assistance Status, FY 2002),
available at http://kuhl.house.gov/UploadedFiles/medicaidworks.pdf.
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When Medicaid patients are young and healthy there is little incen-
tive for physicians and other health care providers to treat them, or spend
much time with them if they do. Reimbursements are too low. 15
Conversely, Medicaid provides large incentive for health care prov-
iders to treat critically ill patients of any age, who need expensive medi-
cal intervention.' 6 Although the federal government sometimes grants
states waivers from Medicaid regulations, the courts find that a health
plan administrator commits illegal discrimination against the disabled by
taking into account any differing capacity to benefit from health care
other than a different probability of avoiding death. 17 Courts recoil at
determining the patient's best interests by weighing the financial costs of
prolonging the life of a terminally ill patient in end-of-life treatment de-
cisions 18 against the likelihood of cure, ability to pay, and reason for the
medical condition, despite the inescapable reality that the scarcity of re-
sources could not possibly allow heroic medical attempts to be made for
every dying publicly-insured patient.1 9 Courts thus discourage rational
cost-benefit trade-offs in Medicaid.
A Medicaid-eligible patient is entitled to any necessary and appro-
priate medical service, with virtually no limits. 20 Unfortunately, this sys-
tem rewards health care providers for increasing the costs of services
they provide, which are passed on to the government. Medicaid law re-
quires a physician treating a Medicaid patient provide all "necessary
medical services" for the patient.21 Such a "medically necessary" stan-
dard of care eliminates potential conflicts that might otherwise arise
through rational cost-benefit analysis between patient incentives to re-
15 Richard Perez-Pena, At Bronx Clinic, High Hurdles for Medicaid Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.corn/2005/10/17/nyregion/nyregion-
special4/17clinic.html; see also Kaiser State Health Facts, Medicaid & SCHIP-New York,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=4&sub=51&rgn=34 (last visited Mar. 9,
2008) (listing New York Medicaid's physician fees for all services as being 70% of the na-
tional average for Medicaid fees in Medicaid Physician Fee Index, 2003 chart).
16 Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1539.
17 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977); Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1557.
18 See, e.g., In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 n.15 (Mass. 1992) ("The cost of care in
human or financial terms is irrelevant to the substituted judgment analysis" in end-of-life
decisions).
19 See, e.g., Peter A. Singer & Frederick H. Lowy, Commentary-Rationing, Patient
Preferences, and the Cost of Care at the End of Life, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 478, 479
(1992). This article includes the debatable estimate that $109 billion was spent in 1990 on
patients who would decline death-prolonging treatment if asked and argues for greater use of
advance Do Not Resuscitate Orders.
20 Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1538-39. One arbitrary limit on spending, a limit that argua-
bly cuts against the principle of furnishing Medicaid-eligible patients with all medically neces-
sary care, is that New York Medicaid will pay for only one patient service per day. See Ian
Urbina, In the Treatment of Diabetes, Success Often Does Not Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006,
at Al.
21 See Beal, 432 U.S. at 444.
2007]
586 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:581
ceive any beneficial care and professional norms of providing any bene-
ficial service. 22 In New York, Medicaid pays for hospital care, physician
services, prescription medication, nursing home care or home care for
bouts of acute illness, and hospice care.
23
B. SHIFTING COSTS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PRIVATE INSURANCE
PLANS
In order to contain costs and shift responsibility for management,
more than 70% of New York Medicaid enrollees now receive their health
care through health management organizations (HMOs) operating under
government contracts that pay out flat annual fees. 24 Across the nation,
state Medicaid programs are shifting most beneficiaries to intermediary
insurers like HMOs in an attempt to contain costs. 25 Unfortunately,
Medicaid's partial privatization does not address the underlying problem
of systemic ignorance of cost-benefit trade-offs in healthcare decisions.
Rather, these decisions are still driven by incentives to ignore early pre-
ventive measures along with the later desire to preserve life as long as
possible by any "medically necessary" beneficial care.
26
22 Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1539. What the Health Care Financing Administration, the
federal agency vested with the authority to administer the Medicaid program and to interpret
Medicaid regulations, considers "medically necessary" is an easy target for criticism. The
agency previously mandated that Viagra be covered under state Medicaid programs, viewing
Viagra as "medically necessary" to treat male impotence. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,247, 35,249(K)
(Sept. 6, 1984). Medicaid no longer covers male impotence drugs. Pub. L. No. 109-91, 119
Stat. 2091 (2005).
23 See New York Department of Health Website, http://www.health.state.ny.us/
healthcare/medicaid/index.htm#services. For an overview of Medicaid eligibility and cov-
ered medical services in each state, see generally MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005, supra note
14.
24 Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
25 Of the more than 44 million total Medicaid population in 2004, over 60% were en-
rolled in a managed care plan, up from 40% in 1996. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, FINANCE SYSTEMS AND BUDGET GROUP 2005, at 18 (Medicaid Managed Care En-
rollment Report Summary Statistics as of June 30, 2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenlnfo/Downloads/mmcer05.pdf (demonstrating the shift in the
national Medicaid population towards managed care enrollment). An example of the trend in
Medicaid administration towards the use of managed care is Florida's recent plan to shift its
Medicaid program from a "defined benefit" plan to a "defined contribution" plan, to be admin-
istered by private managed care programs setting spending caps for each recipient. See Robert
Pear, U.S. Gives Florida a Sweeping Right to Curb Medicaid, N.Y. TIEs, Oct. 20, 2005, at
Al. Due to the federal government freeing states to alter their Medicaid programs to cover
more uninsured and in light of a slight decrease in Medicaid spending in the first nine months
of 2006, which is at least partially attributable to shifting some medication costs to the Medi-
care prescription drug benefit, many states are planning on expanding health care coverage.
See Dennis Cauchon, States to Expand Health Coverage, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2007, at IA.
26 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (reviewing de-
nial of welfare medical benefits under ERISA by the plan administrator under an arbitrary and
capricious standard); Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1550-52 (describing how under this standard of
review, the professional standard of providing any beneficial care dominates judicial decisions,
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Private insurance plans, which typically take the form of managed
care entities like HMOs within the Medicaid program, are driven by
profit motive to offer plans that attract the healthy, but not the sick or
high-risk enrollees, away from competing health plans. 27 Further, Amer-
ican private health insurance plans have little incentive to cover much in
preventive care or basic care for the chronically ill, which tend to be
relatively low-cost but labor-intensive.2 8 Private insurers are fiscally
wise to minimize coverage of preventive care. Money invested into pro-
tecting a patient's health is often of no benefit to the current insurer,
because most insurance subscribers will change plans before the eventual
serious health complications crop up, and the insurer might make a cal-
culated gamble on this reasonable assumption by not covering much pre-
ventive care.
29
Similarly, private insurers do not want to offer too much coverage
for drug benefits or easier access to specialists that would attract the sick,
chronically ill, or high-risk population to subscribe to their plan. Many
insurers assume that chronic illness complications will occur so far into
the future that many people will change jobs, switch insurers, or die
before those complications arise. Thus, most savings from preventive
measures will only be realized by the competition, particularly where
people now generally change health insurance every six years.30 The
insurers, however, are often legally obligated to provide medically bene-
ficial care to current subscribers for high-cost acute care, including ter-
minal illness treatment.
31
II. NEW YORK MEDICAID
A. THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO OVERUSE EXPENSIVE COURSES OF
TREATMENT
In New York, most doctors and many hospitals have little financial
incentive to treat Medicaid patients. New York ranks near the bottom of
the nation in physician reimbursement. For example, as of 2004, Medi-
caid in New York paid a physician $24 for a moderately complex office
consultation, compared to the $91 national average, whereas the same
visits can bring in hundreds of dollars under Medicare or private insur-
ance. 32 Further, this $24 payment would take no account of the com-
which tend to resolve ambiguities in favor of coverage for beneficianes who are denied
benefits).





32 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
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plexity of the problem or the skill of the doctor and would apply to all
visits, whether simple or complex, for general internists and specialists
alike. 33 As a result, many specialists refuse to treat Medicaid patients,
severely restricting the supply of specialist care available to these pa-
tients. 34 Hospitals that do participate in certain Medicaid plans often
schedule Medicaid patients with less-experienced interns or medical re-
sidents or allocate shorter examination periods for these patients, result-
ing in too little time per visit to be thorough.
35
Likewise, managed care entities, with their lump sums of effectively
do-with-this-what-you-will state money, do not offer high enough physi-
cian reimbursement to attract many specialists into participating in their
Medicaid plans. In New York City, for instance, most participating spe-
cialists do business with only two or three of the twenty Medicaid HMOs
there, leaving a gaping shortage of specialists to provide necessary care
to the suffering poor.36 Meanwhile, New York continues to spend about
double the national average per patient, due to higher reimbursements for
services such as hospital care, nursing homes, and mental health
facilities. 3
7
New York thus provides nursing home owners, managers of care
facilities for the functionally and developmentally disabled, drug phar-
macies, and health plan executives with high reimbursement rates for
their care of the elderly, disabled, and helpless. Meanwhile, the children
and potentially healthy and capable young adults are left to wander the
Medicaid labyrinth, given little guidance regarding their health manage-
ment needs and consigned to a do-with-me-what-you-will fatalism.
38
The New York Medicaid program places the general problem of our
incoherent health insurance system in stark relief, as its beneficiaries and
health care providers have perverse incentives to run up medical costs at
the later stages of life. New York, home to the most expensive state
Medicaid system, finds itself strapped for resources as its system's costs
spiral upward. 39 New York is trying to reduce costs through short-term
measures, including shifting administrative costs to local authorities and
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Richard Perez-Pena, Trying to Get, and Keep, Care Under Medicaid: Navigating Sys-
tem Takes More Persistence than Many Clients Have, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at B 1, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/18/nyregion/nyregionspecial4/18jennifer.html.
36 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al; Perez-Pena, supra note 35, at B1.
39 Howard F. Angione, When the Baby Boom Boomerangs: Elder Law Section Publishes
Long-Term Care Report, 77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 29 (2005); Candice Choi, N.Y. Medicaid Spends
More than Rest of U.S., THE CORNING LEADER, Dec. 22, 2005, at 7A.
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privatized managed care40 and cutting certain medications and proce-
dures, while seemingly paying little mind to long-term reform to alter the
incentives its system creates.
4 '
New York's effort to treat Medicaid patients amounts to pushing
aside problems until they are no longer correctable. 42 If a patient is poor,
sick, malnourished, and ill-informed regarding lifestyle choices, diet, and
exercise risks and rewards, the state policy does not provide for incen-
tives to make positive lifestyle changes that would improve overall
health. New York wants Medicaid patients to stop flooding emergency
rooms with non-emergent problems,43 though this perceived result likely
flows in part from the state's decision to cut reimbursements to Medicaid
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans.44 The state all too often
passively affirms a Medicaid beneficiary's choice to abuse his health by
not discouraging him from consuming soda, beer, chips, liquor, tobacco,
and other harmful products, but asks that the patient, in effect, leave the
state alone until he-or at least the corporeal he-wants nothing more
than to be left in peace. Then, when his body gives out and wants noth-
ing more than to unburden itself from the torment, the pain, the withering
abuses of stinging stimulants, flagging depressants, the prior warnings,
complaints, and crises left unresolved-from the unremitting toll of liv-
ing-when all that his body asks and nature demands is that it be merci-
fully lain to rest, that is when New York declares: "Stay with us, hold out
a little longer. This is life, and must be preserved at all costs!"
'45
In 2001, the 3.6% of enrollees with annual spending exceeding
$25,000 accounted for 48.8% of all Medicaid spending. 46 From
2002-2005, New York, like every other state, reduced medical care pro-
40 See, e.g., Brooke J. Sherman, Company Has Idea to Reform Medicaid, ELMIRA STAR
GAZETrE, Sept. 10, 2005, at 6C.
41 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 33-34 (proposing that Congress standardize the long-
term insurance product market).
42 See Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
43 See Ruth E. Malone, Whither the Almshouse? Overutilization and the Role of the
Emergency Department, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 795, 796 (1998).
44 See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1615-16 (explaining that when Medicaid limited reim-
bursement for prescription drugs, Medicaid hospital admissions increased).
45 See, e.g., Urbina, supra note 20, at At ("[New York City diabetes treatment centers]
did not shut down because they had failed their patients. They closed because they had failed
to make money. They were victims of the Byzantine world of American health care, in which
the real profit is made not by controlling chronic diseases like diabetes but by treating their
many complications.").
46 Issue Paper, Anna Sommers & Mindy Cohen, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid & the
Uninsured, Medicaid's High Cost Enrollees: How Much Do They Drive Program Spending?
(Mar. 2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7490.pdf (also providing federal
fiscal year 2001 data showing that 1.1% of enrollees accounted for 25.7% of all Medicaid
spending, that 7.6% of enrollees accounted for 65.3% of spending, and that the cohort of the
elderly living in institutions, 2.7% of all Medicaid enrollees, accounted for 20.6% of all Medi-
caid expenditures).
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vider rates and introduced drug prescription cost controls.47 These ef-
forts have done little to address the astounding costs of "acute care
services," provided where serious medical problems already exist, and
which account for 58% of total Medicaid costs nationwide. 48 Virtually
all spending for children and young, non-disabled adults, the groups that
have the greatest potential to benefit from educational and preventive
care before acute,care is necessary, is included in these "acute care ser-
vices," meaning only a very small portion of total spending goes towards
treatment of non-acute health care needs of the young and non-dis-
abled.49 Yet, while children and able-bodied adults, mostly women, con-
stitute about three-quarters of New York's Medicaid population, only
about one-quarter of spending goes toward their care. 50 By comparison,
more than 70% of spending goes toward caring for disabled and elderly
patients.
5 '
The bulk of the remainder of Medicaid spending goes towards
"long-term care" spending, with half of that spending being for nursing
facility costs. 52 About 42% of Medicaid dollars were previously being
spent on low-income "dual eligible" Medicare beneficiaries, who were
also enrolled in Medicaid to pay for long-term nursing care and prescrip-
tion drugs that Medicare does not cover. 53 Some of this spending was
shuffled off the Medicaid books and onto the Social Security Medicare
ledger on January 1, 2006, when dual eligibles lost Medicaid prescription
drug coverage and were instead offered drug coverage under private in-
surance plans that contract with Medicare. 54
By best accounts, about 10 to 12% of total health care resources,
public and private, are used for the care of persons in their last year of
life.55 Medicaid and the Social Security Insurance health care program,
Medicare, spend an even higher share of their financial resources on end-
47 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNIN-
SURED (2006) [hereinafter MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2006], available at http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235.pdf; see also Kaiser State Health Facts, Total Medicaid
Spending, FY 2006, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=177&cat=4 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2008) (showing updated data on state-by-state Medicaid spending).
48 MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2006, supra note 47.
49 Id.
50 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
51 Id.
52 MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2006, supra note 47.
53 Id.
54 Richard L. Kravitz & Sophia Chang, Medicare Drug Benefit: Promise and Perils for
Patients and Physicians, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2735, 2736 (2005), available at http://con-
tent.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/353/26/2735.
55 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life: What do the Data Show?,
275 JAMA 1907, 1907 (1996); Steven H. Miles et al., End-of-Life Treatment in Managed
Care: The Potential and the Peril, 163 W. J. MED. 302, 302 (1995), available at http://
www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid= 1303057.
NEW YORK MEDICAID
of-life care: one-quarter of total combined Medicaid and Medicare ex-
penditures each year are for the approximately 5% of beneficiaries who
die during that year, with most of that disbursement in the last month of
life for acute hospitalizations.
5 6
Unfortunately, encouraging profligate consumption of the worst cut
of life's offerings by vigorously treating irreversible illness complica-
tions and prolonging terminal illness, is no way to treat our citizens. Life
and its battles are not won at the margins.5 7 They are won in those seem-
ingly fat and easy stages, where margins for error are widest and indis-
cretions might pass with little immediate consequence. When the lungs
don't burn, the joints don't creek, and nachos with beer followed by a
smoke seems to pass as a meal with no immediate adverse effects, the
state does not encourage the consumer, the medical supplier, nor the in-
surers to pay notice to the harm being done. Yet, it is during these prime
cuts of life that people can best accrue and secure good health. New
York should expend more of its technological, medical, and financial
capital on educating and encouraging the blooming living to treat their
bodies well, while accepting the fate of the dying, and furnishing them
with a comfortable avenue through which to pass into the ether.5 8
B. NEW YORK'S MISALLOCATION OF ITS GREEN TO PUT ITS POOR IN
THE PINK
New York is not necessarily more generous to its poor than are
other states simply because it spends more on Medicaid. It may simply
provide the most systematically inefficient Medicaid program in the
United States. In 2003, New York spent more than $38 billion for Medi-
caid, more than any state.5 9 By 2005, New York's Medicaid program
56 Susan C. Miller et al., Government Expenditures at the End-of-Life for Short- and
Long-Stay Nursing Home Residents: Differences by Hospice Enrollment Status, 52 J. OF THE
AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 1284, 1284 (2004) (finding that government expenditures for Medi-
care- and Medicaid-eligible (dual eligible) nursing home patients in the last month of life were
significantly less for hospice than for non-hospice short-term residents).
57 See Michael D. Cantor, Making Tough Choices, 2004 U. I.L. L. REv. 183, 184-88
(2004) (discussing three typical courses of death, which have in recent times displaced the
sudden, at-home death brought on by infectious disease or cancer as the paradigm for dying in
America, in order of most to least predictable: 1) rapid deterioration, as typified by lung cancer
patients, 2) cyclical chronic disease, such as congestive heart failure, and 3) steady deteriora-
tion, exemplified by dementia). These death trajectories present concerns not with getting the
patient well in any permanent sense, but simply with providing care to ease patient and family
suffering. Id.
58 See id. at 194-96.
59 See Kaiser Family Foundation, Raw Data Download, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/
rawdata.jsp (click on "Medicaid & SCHIP" and download file) (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). In
2006, California, the next highest spender at about $34.3 billion, had 10.6 million recipients,
compared with New York's 5.1 million. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Medical Fact Sheet:
New York & California, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/mfs.jsp?rgn=34&rgn=6&x=10&y=8
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
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cost a nation-leading $44.5 billion, covering 21% of doctor and medical
bills, the largest share amongst the most populous states and more than
double the national average of 9.3%.60 New York's mean Medicaid out-
lay per patient in fiscal year 2005 was $7,733, the highest for any state in
the nation. 6' The mean outlay for an "aged," over 65 years old, Medi-
caid recipient in fiscal year 2005 was $21,223.62 New York also spends
more Medicaid dollars for nursing home and other institutional care than
any other state, nearly double that of Pennsylvania, the next highest-
spending state.63 Still growing, New York's Medicaid spending for fis-
cal year 2006 was approximately $44.7 billion.64
Data collected for New York's Department of Health weave a con-
sistent story of how New York expends tremendous financial resources
on its elderly Medicaid population as compared to its young Medicaid
recipients. Statewide, and within New York City and in almost every
county, there are many more recipients age 20 or younger than recipients
age 65 and over-a young-to-old recipient ratio of a little over 4:1-and
yet much less money is spent on the younger population-a young-to-old
spending ratio of about 1:2.65 Even considering that the elderly popula-
tion files far more claims per recipient, which is not surprising given that
people tend to have more health problems when they get older, the
spending per claim for the elderly is much higher, indicating that the
elderly Medicaid recipients not only demand far more medical attention,
but demand costlier day-to-day attention as well.6 6 This can be largely
explained by the costly nature of the kinds of care the elderly tend to
more often demand. For instance, the "aged" Medicaid population con-
60 Choi, supra note 39, at 7A.
61 Only District of Columbia was higher at $7941. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Medi-
caid Payments per Enrollee, FY2005, http://www.kff.org/mfs/hI.jsp (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
62 Id.
63 In fiscal year 2006, New York's Medicaid program spent over $6.9 billion on institu-
tional care for nursing home care and institutional care facilities for the developmentally dis-
abled and the mentally retarded. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Medical Fact Sheet:
Distribution on Medicaid Spending on Long Term Care, FY 2006, http://www.statehealthfacts.
org/comparetable.jsp?ind=I80&cat=4&sub=47&yr=-29&typ=4&sort=202 (last visited Apr. 8,
2008). New York Medicaid spent another $8.5 billion on various types of home care such as
personal and home health services, private duty nursing, and hospice programs. Id.
64 Kaiser Family Foundation, State Medical Fact Sheet: State Lows and Highs, http:l/
www.kff.org/mfs/hl.jsp (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
65 New York State Department of Health Office of Medical Management, Fiscal Finan-
cial Year 2002-2003 Reference File (Microsoft Excel Document on file with author), at
COREF 03 (listing statewide aid for 1,864,088 recipients aged 0-20 at slightly under $5.5
billion on about 40 million individual claims, as compared with about $10.55 billion for the
449,832 recipients aged 65 and over on about 63.6 million individual claims).
66 Total cost for recipients aged 65+ of $10.55 billion for 63.575 million claims, or about
$166 per claim; total cost of $5.496 billion for recipients aged 0-20 for 40.006 million claims,
or about $137 per claim; total cost of $17.853 billion for recipients aged 21-64 for 93.801
million claims, or about $190 per claim. Id.
NEW YORK MEDICAID
sumed more than three-quarters of the over $6 billion spent on long term
care. 67 "Institutional long term care," generally nursing home service
provided as a mandatory benefit under Medicaid, tolled almost $50,000
per recipient at $183 per day of care in fiscal year 2002-2003.68
By contrast, the state only spent an average of $18 per day on child
care, $14 per claim for podiatrist care, and $56 per claim for non-clinical
dental care, all of which are "optional" categories of service that New
York chooses to cover.69 About $117 million was spent on general
childcare; more than ten times that amount was spent on care facilities
for the developmentally disabled. 70 In considering which health care
providers currently benefit from Medicaid, note that less than $400 mil-
lion was spent on physician reimbursement, while $4.17 billion went to
pharmacies, over $3.2 billion more went to HMOs, and over $2.7 billion
to Community and Rehabilitation Services to care for the disabled at a
cost of about $360 per day.7 '
New York spends a higher proportion of its Medicaid dollars on the
disabled and a far lower proportion on children than does the nation as a
whole. 72 These numbers are consistent with the notion that New York
Medicaid costs are inflating because it reimburses at very high rates for
the kinds of care that cost a lot, either through long-term accrual or by
costly acute care procedures, creating financial incentives for health
providers and patients to overuse the more expensive kinds of health
care.
C. THE PRESCRIPTION FOR IMPROVLNG THE HEALTH OF THE POOR
Faced with how to provide optimal health care for an aging popula-
tion, New York Medicaid must, perhaps counter-intuitively, direct more
of its attention to the care of its young. The state should exercise its
discretion in shaping its Medicaid program to form a coherent plan that
encourages healthy living, responsibility, and better basic, non-acute care
67 Aged 65+ long term care cost over $4.8 billion of the more than $6 billion total for
long term care costs, with similarly high proportional spending on the elderly for each subcat-
egories of institutional and non-institutional long term care, as well as for home care, personal
care, assisted living, and hospice. Id.
68 Id. at COREF 03, P Long Term Care.
69 Id. at P HMO CC, P Foot Eye Dental.
70 Id. (listing fiscal year 2002-2003 spending for child care as $116.9 million and spend-
ing for Independent Care Facilities for the Developmentally Disabled (ICF-DD) at $1.191
billion).
71 Id. at COREF 03.
72 For fiscal year 2005, 29.1% of New York's Medicaid spending was on elderly enroll-
ees, 42.5% on disabled enrollees, and 10.7% on children. Kaiser Family Foundation, State
Medical Fact Sheets: Distribution of Medicaid Payments by Enrollment Group, FY 2005,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=182&cat=4. The national averages are
26.1%, 40.8%, and 17.3%, respectively. Id.
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for its poor, while discouraging wasteful and harmful behavior that leads
to grave health outcomes later in life.7 3 Currently, New York provides
very generous reimbursement rates for services like nursing homes,
home care, and hospitals while offering very little reimbursement for ba-
sic doctor visits.
74
The government should not regard the issue of rising health care
costs for the poor as the result of mere political or bureaucratic hurdles
obstructing the ameliorating force of the free market that managed care
privatization of Medicaid seems to promise. 75 Even with the increasing
use of managed care plans to serve the Medicaid population, Medicaid
spending continues to increase. 76 Rather than improving, or at least
maintaining, health care provisions for the poor and disabled while cut-
ting unnecessary public spending, managed care's typical cost contain-
ment strategy of cost capitations often merely serves to divert patients
back to the traditional health care safety net, the emergency room, while
reducing the quality and scope of Medicaid coverage to beneficiaries
prior to the onset of serious health complications. 77 The failure of New
York's privatization and localization efforts in curbing the excesses of
Medicaid spending should come as no surprise.78 Managed care compli-
cates the Medicaid program and hinders the public delivery of health
care.
III. REDEFINING NEW YORK MEDICAID'S PURPOSE
A. A CALL FOR GOVERNMENT REFORM
New York Medicaid must heal itself. As long as the state thinks
only in terms of patching its own systemic problems through shortsighted
corrections, it makes no real progress.79 When the state does not institute
accountability for poor long-term health choices, it merely defers and
accrues interest on the payment of future medical bills.80 Eventually,
73 See Michael S. Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care and the Health Reform Debate: Les-
sons from New York and California, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 433, 456 (1996) (com-
menting on New York's tendency to set policy county-by-county and case-by-case).
74 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al (discussing New York's record of paying less than
almost every state to its doctors for treating Medicaid patients, while paying about twice the
national average on a per-patient basis).
75 See Sparer, supra note 73, at 455-56 (expressing cautious optimism at the prospect of
competing managed care organizations injecting competition into the Medicaid business and
improving care for the poor, particularly in terms of increasing primary care and reducing
emergency room use).
76 See Pear, supra note 1, at A15.
77 See Malone, supra note 43, at 816-21; Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1616.
78 Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1616-17; cf. Sparer, supra note 73, at 455.
79 See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1616; see also Cantor, supra note 57, at 184-88.
80 See Perez-Pena, supra note 35, at B 1 (discussing the confusion of the Medicaid sys-
tem to its beneficiaries).
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poor personal health choices of many Medicaid-eligible citizens will ac-
cumulate, leading to the misery of chronic and terminal illnesses, and the
expensive tests and treatments that accompany them.8' Medicaid en-
courages the poor and otherwise uninsured to demand professional health
care and service when they feel ill, but do little to encourage the mainte-
nance of good health.82 Unless these patients are given a clear financial
stake in becoming and remaining as healthy as possible, Medicaid will
continue to become increasingly inefficient.
Medicaid's policies do little to encourage healthy lifestyle choices
or to discourage unhealthy ones.83 But the cumulative effect of poor
health care decisions becomes more apparent as the patient develops a
chronic or terminal illness. For example, a physician might prescribe
that a patient cease smoking to alleviate particular symptoms. Medicaid
policy, though, allows the patient to continue to smoke, if he so chooses,
without any health care benefit or financial penalty. If he does continue
to smoke, he can continue to visit the doctor as his symptoms persist and
worsen, and the doctor will continue to advise the patient to quit. 84 Even
if he continues to smoke, he loses no Medicaid benefits. 85 Eventually,
the patient's body will no longer be able to resist the punishment tolling
from the harmful effects of smoking, and he will likely contract lung
cancer, throat cancer, emphysema, or some other tobacco-related disease.
The now-dying patient, probably shorn of a great deal of potential life
lost due to tobacco addiction, will likely undergo an expensive battery of
tests, procedures, and medical treatments to temporarily stave off the dis-
ease's fatal consequences. Finally, the patient may be left to slowly
whither in the intensive care unit, continuing the financially, physically,
and psychologically expensive death process.8 6 Aggregating these recur-
ring, sad situations on a statewide level yields high costs for relatively
little benefit.
It is both instructive and disquieting to consider the returns of New
York City's attempts to treat Type 2 diabetes, a chronic disease that is
often the result of genetics, obesity, and inactivity, at four specialized
centers. 87 Even as the number of Type 2 diabetes patients in the city has
doubled, three of the four centers created to preventively treat the disease
81 See Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
82 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
83 See Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
84 See New York Department of Health Website, supra note 23.
85 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (2005); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (2007).
86 See Cantor, supra note 57, at 188; Lynn et al., supra note 6; Singer & Lowy, supra
note 19, at 479.
87 Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
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have closed. 88 Meanwhile, over 100 kidney dialysis clinics, aimed at
managing a complication of late-stage diabetes, have opened. 89
The general fee-for-service health care regime provides financial in-
centive for insurers, hospitals, and doctors to neglect or refuse to provide
less lucrative preventive treatment to control chronic disease. For exam-
ple, a $30,000 foot amputation is typically reimbursed through Medicaid,
whereas appointments with a podiatrist that might have saved the foot,
are not; expensive dialysis treatments for serious diabetes complications
are covered, although earlier treatments to visit a nutritionist that could
keep the kidneys functioning are not.90 A chronic condition like Type 2
diabetes is not profitable for providers, pharmaceutical or insurance com-
panies to treat, because diligent treatment is required over a lifetime,
rather than through short-term acute care.91 Insurance companies that
oversee many Medicaid plans are under financial pressures to not pro-
vide certain benefits, like listing an endocrinologist on the insurance net-
work's primary care physician list, because doing so would attract
subscriptions by the chronically ill.92 Even once enrolled in a plan, care
providers profit not from offering time-consuming preventive treatment,
but rather from hi-tech procedures, like a quick-fix bariatric stomach-
shrinking surgery, which the state will reimburse at a much higher
level.
9 3
Financial incentives to overtreat acute, life-threatening health
problems through hi-tech, high-cost procedures after undertreating early-
stage, low-cost problems represent an endemic flaw in the American
health care system.94 Managed care profiteers, with myopic views on
how to accrue the most reimbursement money while minimizing revenue
sharing with hospitals and physicians, only serve to perpetuate this sorry
situation. If Medicaid policy does not change, miserable outcomes will







94 See id.; see also David Glendinning, Financial Trouble Predicted for Medicare, AM.
MED. NEWS, Jan. 2/9, 2006, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/01/02/
gvsc002.htm (reporting on outgoing Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan's warning
that modem advances in prescription medicines and technological innovations that lead to
doctors over-prescribing certain treatments are major potential sources of health care cost in-
creases that place the financial health of the Medicare program in dire peril).
95 The Cost and Financing of Long-Term Care Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 1-15 (2005) (statement of Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Office) [hereinafter Long-Term Care Hearing], available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/63xx/doc6316/04-27-LongTermCare-testimony.pdf (arguing
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deter high-risk patient enrollment.96 Enrollees will be left ignorant as to
the cause of their ailments and the inexpensive ameliorative courses of
action they can take to prevent worsening health. 97 Medicaid administra-
tors will continue to disallow long-term preventive care as not being
"medically necessary." 98 Short-term, life preservation care will unques-
tionably be insured and reimbursed. 99 The cycle of irrational spending
will continue to spin out wider orbits, with no measures of cost account-
ing or delegations of managerial authority capable of masking the rising
debts that our bent-backward health care system reveals in rising costs,
lost life, and added misery.
B. ACCEPTING THE LIMITS OF HUMAN HEALTH AND AFFIRMING THE
VALUE OF INFORMED PERSONAL CHOICE OVER HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS
Rest assured: the one certainty with which we are blessed is our
mortality. Each person has limited time in which to reap some kind of
value during life. Once squandered, no technology can ever restore this
lost opportunity. Yet, to demand any beneficial care that might prolong
life regardless of costs, as Medicaid laws and regulations seem to do,' 00
can only rest upon a flawed notion of the capacity for human health treat-
ment. The ability to prolong the death process does not necessarily cre-
ate an increase in net health, and in many cases may entail a net
reduction in the quality of life. The much-publicized assisted suicide
scenarios are merely the marginal cases, over which much blood, sweat,
and tears are wrung in trying to arrive at a solution to the ineluctable
mystery of life, and over who finally decides what is in the patient's best
interests.10 1 Regardless of where the answer may lie in deciding when to
demand for long-term care services for the elderly is increasing, with the current health insur-
ance regime discouraging the purchase of private insurance to pay for these future expenses).
96 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
97 Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
98 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al (illustrating through the story of young Angel
Perez, a boy born with a hand deformity and misshapen ears, who needs strong, persistent
advocacy to obtain insurance and proper specialist care to reconstruct his hand and ears,
largely because so few proper specialists will participate in Medicaid plans that reimburse
them so little for their services).
99 See Urbina, supra note 20, at Al ("By the time a situation is acute, when dialysis and
amputations are necessary, the insurer, which has been gambling on never being asked to
cover procedures that far down the road, has little choice but to cover them, if only to avoid
lawsuits, analysts said.").
100 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a (2005); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, (1986).
101 See, e.g., Thomas E. Quill & Diane E. Meier, The Big Chill-Inserting the DEA into
End-of-Life Care, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1-3 (2006), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/
content/short/354/l/1; see also William Saletan, Alternative Sentence: A Counterproposal to
Assisted Suicide, SLATE, Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2114344/ (foreseeing the le-
galized assisted suicide debate as playing out in a manner somewhat parallel to the legalized
abortion debate).
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pull the plug, tuck the eyelids, and turn off the lights, there still remains
the matter of the bill. The potential for reversing the patient's fate in
terms of improving life outcomes, and doing so at a much lower cost, is
decided long before the patient reposes in a death bed. For our youth, the
time is now; for our dying, that time has passed.
For Medicaid recipients, there is no health bill collector arriving at
the door on the first of the month. Medicaid recipients' personal choices
over their lifestyles are left unchecked by appropriate messages from
their ultimate health care provider, the government. Regretfully, many
recipients also must confront the powerful and sometimes imperceptible
forces of physical decay as accelerated by personal neglect. 1°2 Of
course, many Medicaid recipients are responsible, health conscious, and
follow their doctor's orders. 103 But without the government signaling to
Medicaid recipients that they must demonstrate personal responsibility to
be entitled to health care above the level provided, 10 4 personal neglect is
left to work its deleterious effects on those who are ignorant or indiffer-
ent to the physical signals or medical professionals' warnings of long-
term damage. New York should proclaim that medical health insurance
protection is to be the haven of the personally accountable, the achieva-
ble goal of the willing, and the removable luxury of the irresponsible.
However, many Medicaid beneficiaries, no matter how hard they
may try to follow a prescribed course of treatment, will simply be in poor
health, and in need of regular medical care. If Medicaid is to be a social
safety net, it should be a well structured one, woven taut, with strong
fabric, no holes, and little embroidery. The state cannot be stingy with
its dollars for the truly needy.
Nor should it be obtuse in setting the rules of realizing and main-
taining Medicaid benefits, leaving dependents unsure of where they stand
and where they must go to stay on sure footing with the state in terms of
their eligibility, provider plan's benefit coverage, and application
paperwork satisfaction. 105 People's lives are at stake, and concentrating
on marginal issues about who constitutes the acceptable beneficiary class
through rules that appear fickle to its players is an unworthy and ineffi-
102 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al (describing physical suffering that patients have
suffered as a result of ignoring the administrative requirements of Medicaid).
103 See, e.g., Urbina, supra note 20, at Al (discussing success stories of diligently treated
diabetes patients insured by Medicaid).
104 It is no coincidence that there are so many Medicare recipients who achieve dual
eligible status to realize the much more generous prescription drug and nursing care benefits
traditionally provided by Medicaid or that Medicaid fraud is a constant worry of government.
See Kapp, supra note 9, at 724-26. It is a generous insurance program in many respects
besides its vast spending on clear end-of-life situations. See Angione, supra note 39, at 29-30.
105 See Perez-Pena, supra note 35, at B1 ("New York's vast, generous, but disturbingly
imperfect Medicaid program ... seems to offer great largess with one hand, and chip away at
it with the other.").
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cient exercise of state authority.' 0 6 Furthermore, privatizing Medicaid
risks, changing the very aim of the health insurance welfare system from
a program meant to promote health to a cost account meant to limit pub-
lic financial costs in times of personal crisis. Cutting health care spend-
ing ought not be the primary factor determining the success of Medicaid
reform. Rather, health care spending is itself merely a means to the end
of improving the health of those who cannot afford to pay for the neces-
sary care to achieve that end.
Unfortunately, New York is casting its lot more with managed care,
hoping market competition will contain financial costs, at the risk of
casting bare the fates of the impoverished to some hybrid free-market
and spending apportionment system. 10 7 Human health is too capricious
at the individual level for strict rationing of health care. Still, clear
trends on how certain lifestyles translate into certain health outcomes
suggests that encouraging modifications of personal health care behavior
may not prove futile. Only clear guidance to Medicaid recipients on the
health lifestyle directions they should follow to maintain Medicaid eligi-
bility will effect any real improvement in our poor and disabled popula-
tion's quality of health.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEDICAID
A. THE FLORIDA PILOT PROGRAM AND THE FOLLY OF MANAGED
CARE PRIVATIZATION
The government's main response to curbing the costs of Medicaid
in recent years has been to shift the administration of the program from a
joint federal-state government venture to a more localized and privatized
regime.10 8 Florida is beginning a pilot program that carries this process
to its next logical progression, transferring responsibility for Medicaid
patients' health care to private insurance entities, like health maintenance
organizations and physician-hospital provider service networks. 10 9 The
state pays the private managed care entrepreneurs a risk-adjusted pre-
mium and leaves it at the discretion of those private entities to determine
the amount, scope, and duration of covered benefits for Medicaid pa-
tients. 110 The new system effectively replaces beneficiaries' "defined
benefit" package with a "defined contribution" package, an allocation of
106 See id.
107 See Sparer, supra note 73, at 444-45, 455; see also supra notes 24-31 and accompa-
nying text.
108 See Sparer, supra note 73, at 433-35.
109 Amy Snow Landa, Florida Doctors Wary of Medicaid Overhaul, AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan. 2/9, 2006, at 5-6, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/01/02/gvsbO102.
htm.
110 Id. at 5.
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money to purchase a defined set of services."' Florida's program caps
spending per patient and delegates administrative decision-making to for-
profit insurance plans, which need not adhere to federal mandatory stan-
dards under a waiver that the federal Human and Health Services agency
provided to Florida.1 2 Medicaid recipients who require more funds than
is allocated in their annual allotment are supposed to be covered by the
health plans administering the benefits, thus providing an economic in-
centive for health plans to find ways to minimize spending.' 
13
Florida's pilot program has significant pitfalls. Granted, this plan
does hint at the proper acknowledgment that spending money in one area
is often an implicit choice not to spend in another. It also requires Florida
to deposit money into accounts for recipients who enroll in programs to
help them lose weight or stop smoking, thus providing an economic in-
centive to live healthier.' 14 However, Florida is likely dooming its pro-
gram to failure by grounding it upon seriously flawed assumptions.
First, by setting a price ceiling on spending per patient, Florida places in
jeopardy the primary benefit of insurance-pooled risks-if profit-seek-
ing private entities prove stingier or more confusing to consumers than
the government has been in covering the unfortunate." 5 While group
health risks may be predicted within a reasonable degree of certainty,
each individual's year-to-year health and concomitant health costs can be
highly volatile. Under the Florida program, the state will not reimburse
the managed care providers for health catastrophes unanticipated by the
state, leaving it to the managed care provider to pay these costs."16 Sec-
ond, the program apparently sets aside money, enrollee-by-enrollee, ac-
cording to his or her historic medical conditions and use of health
care. 1I7 This means that those who tended to abuse the system in the
past by disregarding their health or the costs of care they place on the
public tab will be rewarded with greater future defined contributions
from the state.1 8 Third, the program deranges the very purpose of Medi-
caid to now be "to bring predictability to Medicaid spending and to re-
I I I Pear, supra note 25, at Al.
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 Id.; see also Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report Highlights News of Recent State Medi-
caid Developments, KAISER DAILY REPORTS., Sept. 28, 2006, at http://www.kaisemetwork.
org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=3&DRJlD=40109 ("Florida .. . allows beneficiaries
who engage in certain healthy behaviors to receive up to $125 which can be used toward
medical expenses.").
115 See Sparer, supra note 73, at 435-36 (stating concerns of safety net providers such as
hospital and community health centers that have traditionally served the uninsured and indi-
gent patient populations).




duce Medicaid's rate of growth."' " 9 But profit motive will not impart
upon managed care organizations the power to divine the health out-
comes of Medicaid enrollees. If managed care should improve cost pre-
dictability, it will do so through stricter denials of coverage, the costs of
which will be shifted to other sources, such as the public safety net of
emergency rooms and community health centers, absent statewide coor-
dination of health care delivery.' 20 Florida's new program is best ex-
plained as a product of defeatism by a state that regards its Medicaid
program as a sunk cost, to be controlled for each patient on a yearly
basis.
Florida effectively admits that it cannot manage its own welfare
health insurance program. Instead, it entrusts a private managed care
system to deal with the problems of Medicaid, hoping that profit motive
will minimize spending and abandoning the overriding concern for
health outcomes. New York should not follow this path, but should in-
stead regard Medicaid as a means of protecting from physical catastrophe
the population of people unable to pay for health care and as an opportu-
nity to encourage healthier habits, with the hope that many Medicaid
enrollees will provide future contributions as productive members of
society.
B. THE VERMONT ELDER CARE PLAN
A truer measure of choice is injected into the lives of Medicaid se-
niors by a plan like that beginning in Vermont, where Medicaid-eligible
seniors may choose among nursing homes, residential care facilities, and
their own homes as their place of care. 12 1 Although Vermont touts the
program as a great future-cost-saver, whether the money and resources,
direct and hidden, to be spent on increased home care will outpace that
previously spent on institutional care remains to be seen.122 New York
should carefully monitor Vermont's success with home and assisted liv-
ing care, as New York itself appears poised to implement a similar pro-
119 Id. (statement provided by federal officials as to why Florida obtained a waiver of
federal mandates).
120 Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1616; Sparer, supra note 73, at 456-58 (arguing that man-
aged care of Medicaid may serve to reduce costs, but its success as good public policy will
likely depend on a host of variables centering on coordinated state-wide activity of health care
providers, and that otherwise managed care effectively serves as a cost-shifting mechanism).
121 Sarah Miller Liana, A Push for Stay-at-Home Healthcare, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 3, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0103/p03s03-ussc.html.
122 See id. (explaining that Vermont will set aside the money it spent previously on Medi-
caid seniors under the new beneficiary waiver option of institutional care plan, but perhaps
without accounting for greater hidden costs like greater family member contributions to care
maintenance).
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gram.123 This is especially important because Medicaid covers more
than half of all elderly nursing home residents.
2 4
C. THE SALUTARY INJECTION OF CHOICE INTO HEALTH CARE
Whether or not a reform like Vermont's will improve Medicaid
elder care efficiency, it seems to point in the proper direction of thinking
about health care insurance, whether for the poor or the affluent, as a
consumer good.' 25 Viewed as a consumer good, health care can be help-
ful where the government and health care providers properly inform the
poor of their individual health care concerns, and provide them with a
suitable array of choices regarding the allocation of time and resources to
manage their health. The best way to spend resources to help the poor
would be decided by how a well-informed consumer population would
prioritize spending and set individual preferences. For example, since
critical life support ventilators are targeted to specific individuals rather
than the public good, it is entirely rational to allow poor people who
collect government subsidized benefits to choose benefits of higher per-
sonal priority like primary care physician appointments or easier access
to appropriate medications. 26
Medicaid currently provides its recipients with full benefit coverage
for critical life support, which is a tremendous financial drain on the
system. In recent years, many people, realizing the futility of "heroic
123 Candice Choi, Nursing Home Availability Varies, ROCHESTER DEM. & CHRON., Jan.
23, 2006, at 5B (discussing a New York State panel that is targeting counties that may have an
excess of nursing home beds with an eye towards closing nursing homes and potentially in-
creasing assisted living care, which the Health Department estimates to be a less expensive
alternative).
124 See Long-Term Care Hearing, supra note 95, at 8. The Congressional Budget Office
endorses the idea of reducing Medicaid long-term care spending by strengthening rules to
reduce Medicaid estate planning through disposition of assets or "spending down" into Medi-
caid eligibility, while acknowledging that such measures would do little to contain total costs.
See id. at 11.
125 See Daniel Gross, Low Co-Pays Everyday: Could Wal-Mart Solve America's Health
Care Crisis?, SLATE, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2133840/ (arguing that Wal-Mart
is well-positioned to promote the idea to the public that health-care is a consumer good, which
may come as a welcomed development, where "low-income consumers of preventive health
care and low-end insurance are underserved in many parts of the country, in much the same
way lower-income rural retail consumers were underserved when Sam Walton built his first
Wal-Mart in the 1960's."). State or municipal governments may eventually force Wal-Mart
and other large, generally low-wage employers to spend a base level on employee health insur-
ance to unburden the states from uninsured employees on Medicaid rolls. See, e.g., Michael
Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at El.
126 See Steven E. Landsburg, Do the Poor Deserve Life Support?, SLATE, Jan. 3, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2133518/ (arguing against criticism of the Baylor Regional Medical
Center's decision to remove a 27-year-old terminal cancer patient from her ventilator for fail-
ure to pay her medical bills, resulting in her quick death, asking the critics to first address the
attractiveness of the underlying public choice of spending less on goods poor people value the
most in consideration of giving every poor person ventilator insurance).
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efforts" to prolong life (or death, if you will) of terminally ill individuals,
have preemptively signed "living wills," with clear directives that often
avoid such futile efforts.' 27 Mandating living wills specifying advance
directives for Medicaid enrollees could remove some confusion in end-
of-life decision-making and their attendant high costs. '
28
Throughout the swirl of life's many stages, we all eventually face
choices. The hand of the state may intervene, as a guiding force, the
blind prophet with its hand at the beggar's back. The runny-nosed baby,
sorrily clad in a well-worn knit-sweater hood, absolved of choice, save
which finger to cling upon, lives in ignorance and uncertainty. The
schoolchild, brain sweltering with ideas, terrible violence curdling within
expanding limbs, id flowing through innocent fingers, knows only that
which she sees, touches, smells, hears, fears, and screams. The teenager-
cum-independent, grasping at strings and gasping in fumes, huffs an in-
toxicating aroma, and drowns out the voices, dulling the fire, quelling the
mob, stifling the train of thought, losing sight of a bastion of hope. She
tears asunder her life's cradle, the possibilities draining, unrealized. The
woman, bringing up baby, numb to the papers, dumb in her capers, igno-
rant of the big hand, claws through quicksand, with gritty dirt where
fingernails ought to be. She consumes the black spirit and exhales the
cinders through her exfoliating balloon-lungs, the sands of time dripping
Kool, but all too fast.
If Medicaid recipients were given the opportunity to choose whether
they prefer critical life support, should they become terminally ill, or the
equivalent cost-value of other goods, such as basic medical examina-
tions, most would probably choose the basic care. 129 However, before
society can justifiably attribute the causes of poor health outcomes to the
sick themselves, these Medicaid patients must be given the opportunity
to make an informed choice between long-term consequences and short-
term enjoyment. If our government wishes to delegate further decision-
making, administration, and oversight of Medicaid to the local and pri-
vate spheres, it should take the further step of delegating responsibility
down the chain of authority, and imbue the clay figure beneficiaries with
the rosy hue of free will in their health care decisions. The integrity of
Medicaid must ultimately be measured by how well it serves to improve
life. Those Medicaid recipients, whose lives are meant to be improved
by the program, ought to be best situated to determine their own self
interests, but this is only so if the recipients are empowered with infor-
127 M. Gregg Bloche, Managing Conflict at the End of Life, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED.2371,
2371-73 (2005).
128 Singer & Lowy, supra note 19, at 479.
129 See Landsburg, supra note 126.
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mation regarding their health and the rules of the insurance game.' 30
Therefore, Medicaid recipients must be given the power, incentive, and
responsibility to chart their own course within the Medicaid system.
V. RECENT NEW YORK REFORM EFFORTS
Although New York has recently taken some initial steps to reform
Medicaid, it has yet to address the fundamental problems inherent in its
fee-for-service reimbursement system and the lack of patient accounta-
bility. Further, New York continues to move towards privatizing Medi-
caid and to focus its enforcement oversight more on improper beneficiary
enrollment than on improper provider billing and fraud schemes. By al-
locating funding responsibility and control to local counties, while simul-
taneously delegating authority to determine individual health plans to
for-profit managed care organizations, New York is relinquishing its op-
portunity to fundamentally reform its Medicaid program for the long-
term benefit of its citizenry.
A. DRUG PRESCRIPTION SPENDING CONTROL
To begin with, New York must make basic reforms to reduce waste-
ful prescription drug spending. In 2005, New York spent $3.8 billion,
more than any other state on prescription drugs for Medicaid patients. 1
31
Still, New York lagged behind more than 30 other states in finally imple-
menting the basic cost control of a "preferred drug list" selected by a
committee of doctors and pharmacists for each class of treatment. 132
This list restricts the use of costlier name brand drugs where generic
drugs would be similarly effective, and creates bargaining leverage for a
state's Medicaid agency to negotiate lower medication prices with manu-
facturers. 133 Perhaps much of the cost saving potential has been lost,
given how medication costs have inflated, and some of New York Medi-
caid's drug bargaining power has been lost to the Medicare Plan D shift
of dual eligible enrollees, a major former source of Medicaid beneficiary
drug consumption. 134 Also problematically, New York seems wedded to
reimbursing drug-dispensing pharmacies based on "average wholesale
price" figures provided by drug manufacturers rather than by actual
cost. 135
130 See id.
131 Michael Luo, Drug Costs Run Free Under New York Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2005, at Al.
132 Id.
133 Id. (noting that doctors must file for and receive State approval to prescribe drugs to
Medicaid patients that are not on the preferred list).
134 Id.; Kravitz & Chang, supra note 54, at 2736.
135 Luo, supra note 131, at A1.
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B. HEALTH CARE PROVIDER FRAUD PREVENTION
Another basic flaw New York Medicaid is just beginning to address
and must correct is its enforcement policies to reduce health service and
insurance provider fraud. A New York Times computer analysis of pub-
lic records revealed wide-ranging indications of extensive Medicaid
fraud in New York State. 136 Examples of possible Medicaid fraud in-
cluded: doctors prescribing to AIDS patients unnecessary and extraordi-
narily expensive muscle-building drugs that were later diverted to
bodybuilders; dentists billing the state for phantom fillings and improper
procedures; school districts receiving over $1 billion in questionable pay-
ments for speech therapy sessions without the required evaluations; med-
ical ambulette transportation services charging the state for rides to many
people able to walk on their own and for rides that likely never took
place; and nursing home operators collecting high-income salaries from
Medicaid payments while providing substandard care for their nursing
home residents. 137 A former chief state investigator of Medicaid fraud
and abuse estimated that at least 10% of state Medicaid dollars were paid
out on fraudulent claims and that another 20 to 30% were based on un-
necessary spending. 1
38
Whatever the precise numbers may be, a significant portion of the
approximately $10,600 that the government now spends per each of the
4.2 million New York Medicaid recipients is almost surely now being
devoted to making ostensible health care providers and insurance plan
managers rich, rather than to improving the welfare of the poor and dis-
abled. 139 Yet, New York has maintained an uncoordinated auditing and
policing system with diminishing resources and diminishing returns in
recent years, even as New York Medicaid has grown in size. 140 Early
returns on New York's supposedly reinvigorated commitment to prose-
cute fraud and abuse by allowing some counties to flag questionable
spending in their systems are promising, with Rockland County quickly
uncovering millions of dollars worth of questionable billing that state
officials will investigate and prosecute. 141




140 See Clifford J. Levy & Michael Luo, Governor Adds Muscle to Curb Medicaid Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at AI (citing a 70% drop in fraud and abuse recoveries by the State
Department of Health since 2000 and explaining how New York's policing resources were
disjointed and lagging technologically, missing even clear indications of billing improprieties,
likes spikes in billing claims).
141 Richard Perez-Pena, Officials in Rockland Question Medicaid Billings of $13 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 2006, at BI.
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Encouragingly, at least basic reforms of the New York Medicaid
system are on the horizon. Cheats and crooks have long followed the
Medicaid money, creating fraudulent schemes and crime rings, scraping
tax dollars off the unassuming backs of taxpayers, and swiping vigorish
from the gambling insurers by lopping off chunks of the state's lump
sum disbursements earmarked for patient care. Until recently, Albany
seemed to regard the situation with sardonic disinterest. 42 Now, the
state government has at least mustered perturbation at the prospect of the
widespread bilking and created a new Inspector General's office to cen-
tralize, expand, and reinvigorate the policing of fraud by health care
providers. 143 Similarly, New York State now offers a bounty reward to
Medicaid fraud whistleblowers, something previously offered by other
states and the federal government.44 Also, New York State will imple-
ment a Preferred Drug List, asking pharmaceutical companies to provide
the state with rebates, and requiring them to pay to get their drugs on the
list from which doctors can prescribe without gaining authorization from
the Health Department. 145 Other cost saving measures include eliminat-
ing coverage for government employees, increasing co-payments for cer-
tain medications, and adjusting premium rates for the working poor
under New York's Family Health Plus Plan. 146 The state budget esti-
mates $1.4 billion in savings from the more than $44.5 billion in annual
Medicaid costs. 147
C. EASING NEW YORK MEDICAID'S UNIQUE BURDEN ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Facing down a financial crisis, Chemung County Executive Tom
Santulli is trying to overhaul his County's Medicaid program. Mr. San-
tulli's efforts provide some hope that New York may soon find a starting
model for conscientious and compassionate Medicaid reform efforts.
New York has approved Mr. Santulli's plan to designate an independent
agency to administer Chemung County's Medicaid services. 148 Case
managers are expected to monitor patients to ensure they show up for
appointments, see appropriate medical professionals, and receive proper
142 See Levy & Luo, supra note 140, at Al.
143 Clifford J. Levy, Governor Plans Agency to Fight Medicaid Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2006, at AI.
144 New York will allow citizens suing on behalf of the government to recover a percent-
age of the public funds recovered. Candice Choi, Medicaid Reforms Attack Fraud, Waste,




148 See Salle E. Richards, State Approves Medicaid Reform, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETrE, Dec.
29, 2006, at IC.
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medications. 149 The County will also offer patients the opportunity to
learn preventive health skills, including proper diet.' 50
Though undesirable, the need for greater county participation in the
administering and policing of New York Medicaid has rapidly increased
in recent years. New York is the only state that imposes a large portion
of the financial responsibility for Medicaid's cost on local govern-
ments. 151 In 2005, New York State paid about $6.6 billion for Medicaid,
which is 15% of the state's entire Medicaid budget.1 52 Unfortunately,
Upstate New York has recently encountered a financial crisis in meeting
its financial obligations to the Medicaid program. Recently, much of
Upstate New York dipped into a prolonged recession while New York
expanded Medicaid enrollment. 53 For example, over the past five years
in Chemung County, Medicaid rolls have increased by 50%, while em-
ployer-provided health insurance decreased.
5 4
Combining rapidly increasing heath care costs with more enrollees,
Chemung County's Medicaid costs practically doubled in five years to
$18.5 million in 2005, consuming one-fifth of the total County budget
and virtually all of the property tax revenue.' 55 With the tax revenue
base shrinking and the option of increasing property and sales taxes al-
ready stretched to their limits, Chemung County's government has been
forced to cannibalize itself, cutting public employment and services and
leasing the local landfill to a private contractor, with permission to ex-
pand the waste dump.' 56 Neighboring Steuben County's local share of
Medicaid costs for 2006 is estimated to be $19 million, delaying County
highway repair and development programs. 157 The state has relieved
some of the financial burden by capping the growth of the local Medicaid
costs. 58 Still, this may not be enough because many county govern-
ments are being held hostage by Medicaid burdens.
149 Mary Perham, Pataki's Proposed Budget Could Include Medicaid, THE CORNING
LEADER, Jan. 14, 2006, at 3A.
150 Id.
151 Richard Perez-Pena & Michael Luo, As New York Medicaid Grows, Swelling Costs







157 See Mary Perham, Better Roads Among Legislature's Goals, THE CORNING LEADER,
Jan. 8, 2006, at 3A.
158 Jay Gallagher, N.Y. to Pay $1.1B for Medicaid Cap, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETrE, Jan. 14,
2006, at IC (explaining that according to the estimated $46.5 billion cost estimates for New
York Medicaid in fiscal year 2005-2006, the 3.5% cap on Medicaid spending by counties and
New York City was expected to shift $1.1 billion to the state government that would otherwise
be paid by local governments, including $4.07 million by Chemung County and $4.93 million
by Steuben County).
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D. SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS LINGER
While the recent reforms are important and some may prove help-
ful, they should mark just the beginning of a realization of a rational,
cohesive plan to insure the poor and the disabled. New York spent about
$3.8 billion of its Medicaid dollars on prescription drugs in 2004159 and
allocated up to 10% of total Medicaid spending towards fraudulent
claims. 160 Policing fraud at the health provider level is particularly en-
couraging, since New York is renowned for being lax in detecting Medi-
caid crime by unethical insurance plan managers and doctors.
16 1
However, even ideal oversight and enforcement in these trouble areas
would leave New York with the most expensive Medicaid program. The
twin demands of a renewed commitment to devoting greater attention to
the care and guidance of the younger Medicaid enrollees and containing
spending on irretrievably ill individuals remain as pertinent as ever. Ba-
sic reforms to drug coverage and fraud-policing will help slow the accel-
eration of cost increases. Still, New York must make more extensive
changes to preserve the viability of Medicaid. Otherwise, New York will
be, at best, pennywise and pound-foolish.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
New York must make fundamental structural changes to its Medi-
caid program, and soon. For instance, New York Medicaid should obtain
a waiver from the federal government regarding certain "medically nec-
essary" mandatory care items that it could instead provide on a condi-
tional basis, connected to recipients' choices following medically
prescribed plans.' 62 For physically capable applicants and recipients,
participation in smoking cessation, weight loss, or other wellness pro-
grams should be prerequisites in obtaining certain welfare health bene-
fits. Further, patients who keep their appointments with medical
professionals and other responsible behavior ought to be able to earn
good behavior credits, strengthening their entitlement claims to more
beneficial public health insurance plans.
163
159 Luo, supra note 131, at Al.
160 Levy & Luo, supra note 5, at Al.
161 See id.
162 For an overview of the waiver requirements the Social Security Act authorizes states
to use in operating their Medicaid programs, see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serives,
Overview of Medicaid State Wavier Program Demonstration Projects, http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
163 West Virginia has already received federal approval to embark on a plan to reward
with added benefits its "responsible" Medicaid patients who sign and abide by a pledge to
attend health improvement programs, checkups, screenings and appointments as directed,
while limiting non-abiding patients to only federally required basic services. Potential obsta-
cles to this program's success, however, include the patient population's lack of information
regarding the new plan and their difficulties in obtaining access to the preventive medicine
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Currently, our government runs a deficit in understanding the more
fundamental problems with our health insurance system. 64 "It's almost
as though the system encourages people to get sick and then people get
paid to treat them," 165 while "[o]ur national unwillingness to acknowl-
edge the conflict between efforts to limit medical spending and insistence
on all possibly beneficial care worsens this toxicity."'1 66  New York
Medicaid must be willing to modify its delivery of health care.
Much of the targeted Medicaid population, the poor, tends to be an
irresponsible and undisciplined group as compared to the population at
large. 167 Doctors commonly complain that Medicaid patients are highly
unreliable; they walk in without appointments and regularly miss ap-
pointments that they do schedule.' 68 Medicaid enrollees, however, also
comprise about one-fifth of New York's total population, 169 and consti-
tute a diverse group of people, many of whom are capable of making
healthier lifestyle choices that better suit the new demands that the gov-
ernment might place upon them. 170
A. INFORMING THE MEDICAID POPULATION
Information is power. The more Medicaid patients are taught about
their health and the courses of recommended treatment, the more likely
they will be to comply with their treatment. Early intervention and pre-
vention of health problems creates greater opportunities to effectively
West Virginia means to promote. See Erik Eckholm, Medicaid Plan Prods Patients Toward
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at A], A29.
164 See, e.g., National Governors Association Meeting Addresses Recent Medicaid Revi-
sions, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL'Y REP., Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.kaisemetwork.org/
daily.reports/rep index.cfm?DRID=35677 (noting that a congregation of state governors in
Washington, D.C. "expressed guarded optimism" that a recent federal budget reconciliation
law proposal to cut Medicaid entitlement benefits could help curb Medicaid costs, but failing
to reach any consensus on how to reform Medicaid other than to oppose the reconciliation law
proposal to pare federal funding to states by limiting states' use of certain accounting tech-
niques and changing the drug reimbursement formula).
165 Urbina, supra note 20, at AI (quoting Dr. Mathew E. Fink, a former president of Beth
Israel Hospital in New York City, which previously operated a diabetes center until the reality
of losing money on every diabetes patient it treated through comprehensive chronic care
forced the center to close).
166 Bloche, supra note 127 (explaining why our national debate about how to medically
treat patients in a vegetative state will not be resolved without a fuller accounting of the cost
considerations that attach to end-of-life decisions).
167 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
168 Id. (explaining the most common reason doctors cite for refusing to see Medicaid
patients, however, is probably still the low Medicaid reimbursement rates).
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Urbina, supra note 20, at Al (illustrating how a committed preventive
medicine clinics to treat diabetes patients, many of whom are on Medicaid, can successfully
improve patient awareness and understanding of their disease, which leads to improved disease
maintenance through more diligent self-administered blood-sugar level testing, and improved
diet and exercise).
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minimize serious complications and negative outcomes. Educating pa-
tients will create a sense of responsibility and control over their well
being, which the current system does not foster. Left blind to the cause
and effect of their own courses of action, many Medicaid patients will
continue to wallow in an acquired pit of fatalism.' 71
Left to neglect, disease will fester. Much of the Medicaid popula-
tion's apparent indifference to their own health and welfare, marked by
inattention to doctor appointments, ignorance as to their insurance status,
and inability to recognize their poor health habits and symptoms, leaves
their physicians and caseworkers cold.t 72 Ignorance reigns. Defeatism
abounds. Government administrators, marking off Medicaid recipients
as hopeless cases and sunk costs, pass the buck. Private health plans
siphon off any profit they can from monthly block grants, offering as
little coverage for preventive care as they can "manage."' 73
B. SIMPLIFYING THE ENROLLMENT PROCESS AND DEMANDING
BENEFICIARY RESPONSIBILITY
The Medicaid enrollment process should be simplified. In order to
conserve administrative costs and reduce confusion amongst Medicaid-
eligibles, insurance administrators, and health care providers, New York
should reduce the paperwork and proof necessary to apply for and main-
tain Medicaid coverage. Currently, New York's Medicaid renewal pro-
cess is possibly the most complex in the nation, entailing six pages of
forms to fill, six more pages to read, and duplicative proofs of informa-
tion such as income and citizenship status. 174
This front-end filtering of consumer fraud, meant to prevent unde-
serving people from receiving Medicaid benefits through improper en-
rollment or renewal, saves little money but places a heavy administrative
burden on the state. According to federal regulators, care for ineligible
patients account for less than two-percent of Medicaid costs in every
state.' 75 In terms of defrauding the program, the real cost drain comes at
the provider level, not at the consumer level.' 76 Yet, largely due to a
daunting enrollment and renewal process, an estimated one million eligi-
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Medicaid HMOs operating in Broward County, Florida, site of part of the Florida
Medicaid privatization pilot program, have recently operated at an 18.6% average profit rate.
Landa, supra note 109, at 7.
174 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
175 Id.
176 See id. (quoting Robert Goldberg, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, as saying,
"I don't think there's any question that most of the fraud is provider-driven, not patient-
driven.").
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ble New Yorkers are not in the Medicaid program. 7 7 This number will
likely grow if New York loses its federal waiver, which permits the state
to implement its "facilitated enrollment" program, allowing HMO's,
community groups, and health clinics to assist people in filling out their
Medicaid applications.
78
Clearly, those Medicaid enrollees who are not capable of helping
themselves should not be punished for reasons beyond their control.
Children, the disabled, and many other Medicaid-eligible citizens must
not slip through the cracks of the system. If anything, the government
should encourage more facilitated enrollment to ensure that such people
receive the welfare health insurance to which they are legally entitled.
Medicaid reform must reflect informed, rational policy choices that
discourage public expenditures on life support and costly acute care pro-
cedures, while creating incentives for Medicaid recipients to lead healthy
lifestyles. To achieve these ends, New York must accept that forces of
nature conspire to weaken and destroy human life, but steadfastly affirm
that the government is itself capable of improving Medicaid. New York
must also accord greater respect to its Medicaid population, whose lives
the state now seems to regard as a source of burden, except at those end-
stages when human life tends to quickly diminish in force and capability,
when any beneficial care is deemed not only desirable, but "medically
necessary." 
179
New York should not try to curb Medicaid costs by merely cutting
benefits and welfare rolls, by further routinizing and limiting methods of
medical diagnosis and prescription of Medicaid patients or by delegating
authority to private entities to administer Medicaid.1 80 Instead, New
York should allow for greater physician autonomy in prescribing individ-
ual courses of treatment for patients, with strong financial incentives for
the promotion of preventive medicine and a measure of financial disin-
centive for Medicaid patients to be kept alive for the sake of prolonging
the death process.
The state should empower the poor with the responsibility of mak-
ing intelligent health care decisions. Medicaid patients and their health
177 Id.
178 Richard Perez-Pena, For Medicaid Clients, New Hurdle Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2005, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/l1/21/nyregion/21medicaid.html (ex-
plaining arguments in favor of "facilitated enrollment" include keeping up enrollment, saving
pointless trouble in re-enrolling people incorrectly dropped from the program, and avoiding
the forcing of such people to emergency room care for non-emergent health problems. Argu-
ments against facilitated enrollment include the encouragement of HMO's to spend too much
on advertising and unscrupulously signing people up to their plans, and the risk of placing
some ineligible people onto Medicaid).
179 See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 2-5 (typical reform measures) and notes i08-20 (privatization) and
accompanying text.
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care providers should clearly understand that it is in their best interests to
anticipate future illness and to treat potential problems sooner rather than
later through diligent patient practices of proper diet, exercise, and long-
term medical professional guidance.' 81 Early recognition and treatment
of health problems results in better health outcomes. 182 Young or old,
patients often benefit from the same tenets of care; prevention and early
recognition and treatment of deteriorating conditions. 183 A system of in-
centives for "good" behavior and long-term financial disincentives for
"bad" behavior should be incorporated into the Medicaid system.
Patients are already, in effect, forced to work for their benefits in an
unproductive way that doubles as an eligibility screen-the confounding
enrollment process.' 84 Making patients work for benefits in a more
straightforward and potentially helpful manner-a financial incentive
scheme-is a more rational way to guide behavior. The state should
shift the administrative focus of the yearly Medicaid application and re-
newal process from a background check for proof of pedigree and place-
ment in one of a coterie of private and public health plans, to an
evaluation of the enrollee's needs as well as compliance in following
medical directives. 185 Entry into the program should not be burdensome.
Exit from Medicaid ought to be based upon either change of financial
circumstance removing need or failure to follow doctor or caseworker
prescriptions. However, keeping Medicaid eligibles off the rolls should
not result from failure to comprehend a difficult and shifting insurance
scheme, such as that which currently exists.
Medicaid must place some responsibility on its enrollees in return
for government benefits. The paradigm should shift to Medicaid recipi-
ents signing "contracts" for care, with built-in provisions for maintaining
individual responsibilities. 186 One line of questioning should regard the
181 Urbina, supra note 20, at Al (illustrating how the chronically ill poor particularly
demand steady reminders of how to keep up habits of appropriate diet and exercise and regular
personal health monitoring).
182 See, e.g., Vinay M. Nadkarni, et. al., First Documented Rhythm and Clinical Outcome
from In-Hospital Cardiac Arrest Among Children and Adults, 295 JAMA 50, 56 (2006) (con-
cluding that children survived to hospital discharge following in-hospital cardiac arrest more
often than adults did, primarily because of better outcomes following loss of pulse, and sug-
gesting that "an early aggressive approach to pediatric resuscitation may have contributed to
better outcomes.").
183 See, e.g., Linda Quan, Adult and Pediatric Resuscitation: Finding Common Ground,
295 JAMA 96, 96-97 (2006).
184 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
185 Cf Perez-Pena, supra note 35, at B1; Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al (describing
current process).
186 West Virginia's pilot program that asks beneficiaries to sign pledges to do their best to
remain healthy and to attend health improvement programs as directed, with built-in incentives
for compliance, would seem a potentially useful natural experiment for testing the efficacy of
this model. Still, early indications that beneficiaries do not understand the pledge or the pro-
gram in general, as well as inadequate transportation facilities to service much of the rural
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patient's record of keeping medical appointments. For example, a Medi-
caid patient could be dropped from a more generous public Medicaid
plan for failing to show up for three different appointments with a doctor
or for some high no-show rate. Also, patients could have their Medicaid
benefit coverage significantly reduced for failing to comply with physi-
cian orders, like not attending smoking cessation clinics, failing a nico-
tine urinalysis, or not meeting with other medical professionals referred
to for treatment.
Irresponsible patients, rather than being fully covered and reim-
bursed for all beneficial care, would only be entitled to coverage for ba-
sic doctor visits with a primary care physician and certain preventive
medical programs. Emergency care and life preservation measures must
also be provided. In terminal cases, perhaps comfort care, rather than
expensive treatments, could be administered, with the state legislature
and federal administrators to provide the necessary planning details.
However, New York State should not continue to spend its most expen-
sive welfare resources on those people who do not prove themselves re-
sponsible or accountable for their actions. Nothing alerts a previously
irresponsible patient's senses quite like some brush with her own mortal-
ity. It is fitting, then, that such a patient accepts some personal responsi-
bility for her own health care.
C. IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE FOR MEDICAID PATIENTS
On the medical provider side, New York State should address the
lack of specialist care for Medicaid patients by increasing doctor reim-
bursement and by requiring that all physicians and hospitals accept
Medicaid patients. First, New York must change its Medicaid reim-
bursement scheme to pay more for basic doctor visits and even more for
specialist consultations. As noted earlier, New York Medicaid lan-
guishes near the bottom of the nation in reimbursing its physicians, and
makes little distinction between simple and more complicated treat-
ments. 187 Since most specialists choose not to treat Medicaid patients
and health clinics designed to treat chronic illnesses tend to be unprofita-
ble ventures, many Medicaid patients have to travel long distances to
find a physician.' 88 New York must reimburse physicians enough that
they actually profit, or at the very least break even from treating Medi-
areas covered by the program may portend difficulties in the program's effective application.
See Eckholm, supra note 163, at Al.
187 Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al. New York does plan to increase its Medicaid reim-
bursement rates to doctors for 2007. Doug Trapp, Medicaid Payment Inching up, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006, at 1. Still, reimbursement levels are expected to remain well below
treatment expenses. Id. at 2.
188 See Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at A]; Eckholm, supra note 163, at Al. See generally,
Urbina, supra note 20.
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caid patients. 189 Second, New York should require all physicians to ac-
cept some number of Medicaid patients as a condition for retaining their
license to practice medicine in the state. Doing so will ensure the supply
of able physicians available to the needy and infuse a sense of common
ownership of the Medicaid program throughout the medical profession.
If New York State sufficiently raised Medicaid physician reim-
bursement levels, doctors would not incur a financial penalty each time
they treat a Medicaid patient. 190 With better reimbursement rates for
comprehensive preventive care for Medicaid enrollees, health clinics pri-
marily created for Medicaid enrollees can finally become financially via-
ble enterprises.19' Physicians who grow frustrated with patients who act
irresponsibly can alert program administrators to the patient's poor medi-
cal attendance and compliance record, requesting that the patient no
longer be referred to that physician, and that the state remove certain
Medicaid coverage for the patient.
D. ENCOURAGING PREVENTIVE CARE AND DISCOURAGING BEHAVIOR
DETRIMENTAL TO HEALTH
A system of incentives and disincentives should be infused into the
welfare health insurance provisions. For instance, through "good" be-
havior, an enrollee may earn a generous Medicaid plan, one that includes
not only free tobacco cessation programs, obesity treatment, and other
preventive medicine programs, but the promise to fully pay for all care in
treating chronic illnesses like diabetes, cancer, and AIDS, as well as
other hospital care, physician services, prescription medication, nursing
home care or home care for bouts of acute illness, and hospice care. In
other words, that enrollee keeps what New York Medicaid already pro-
vides, with the added benefit of increased availability of medical provid-
ers and treatment programs, adding particular value to younger Medicaid
beneficiaries. Those who fail to follow physician orders, and give other
indicators of personal neglect or abuse, would receive a reduction in their
public health insurance entitlement package.
The benefits of these changes outweigh the costs. Granted, such a
program constrains certain freedoms of choice for patients and physi-
cians alike. Patients who lose certain benefits for previously accepted
irresponsible behavior, like failing to keep scheduled doctor appoint-
ments and continuing to overeat and not exercise, may feel wronged,
especially if they have never been held accountable for these behaviors
before. 192 Doctors and hospitals who do not wish to participate in treat-
189 Cf. Urbina, supra note 20, at Al.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Cf. Perez-Pena, supra note 15, at Al.
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ing those sometimes irresponsible and relatively non-lucrative Medicaid
consumers may resent the state ordering them to see these patients.
However, as a matter of equity, all physicians should offer services to
Medicaid patients to match supply to public demand for providing the
needy with more preventive care and chronic illness maintenance. Both
higher physician reimbursement and mandatory physician participation,
along with strict enforcement of compliance codes to minimize fraud,
should become mandatory state policy. For the sake of rewarding the
responsible, health care providers should be paid more, and treated pa-
tients should be paid in kind, for facing their health problems earlier on
and learning how to manage those problems on a long-term basis. Pa-
tients could finally find the specialist care they need early enough to
effectively treat their health problems and physicians who do treat them
would receive profitable reimbursement fees for every Medicaid patient
they treat. 193 Health care choices would often be made and courses of
treatment would begin before it would be too late to restore health, and
Medicaid would not have to spend a large portion of its budget on expen-
sive tests and treatments for irretrievably dying patients.
E. CONCLUSION
The government must take back control of Medicaid and use the
program as a valuable tool in a broader effort to reform the health care
profession. Medicaid presents an opportunity to inform and guide the
public. If the poor and disabled are informed of the health risks that their
lifestyles create, and are given the power and incentive to alter their be-
havior, the focus of health insurance may shift back to its proper plane,
that of improving health, by moving away from the market-driven incen-
tives that lead to substandard preventive care and overemphasized acute
care. The government, with the available economic advantage of mo-
nopoly control of the Medicaid program, and the financial tools of defin-
ing eligibility requirements, benefit entitlements, and reimbursement
levels, is in the unique position of being able to provide comprehensive
health care insurance for all its "categorically" and "medically" needy
citizens. Medicaid has the potential to create a model of efficiency com-
bined with compassion that private insurers lack. New York State should
reclaim its ambitious welfare program as its own beacon of hope for its
sick and impoverished citizens.
193 See Urbina, supra note 20, at Al (contending that under the current Medicaid reim-
bursement scheme, every basic Medicaid patient visit represents a financial loss for the treat-
ing physician and the hospital).
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